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Abstract
Little can be achieved in the design of security protocols without trusting at least
some participants. This trust should be justified; or, at the very least, subject to
examination. A way of strengthening trustworthiness is to hold parties accountable
for their actions, as this provides strong incentives to refrain from malicious behavior.
This has lead to an increased interest in accountability in the design of security
protocols.
In this work, we combine the accountability definition of Künnemann, Esiyok, and
Backes [22] with the notion of case tests to extend its applicability to protocols with
unbounded sets of participants. We propose a general construction of verdict functions
and a set of verification conditions which achieve soundness and completeness.
Expressing the verification conditions in terms of trace properties allows us to
extend Tamarin—a protocol verification tool—with the ability to analyze and verify
accountability properties in a highly automated way. In contrast to prior work, our
approach is significantly more flexible and applicable to a wide range of protocols.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Accountability is a way to strengthen the trust in protocol participants. It has emerged
as a recent paradigm that is being explored in the design of security protocols. Holding
parties accountable for their misconduct—most often detection is deterrent enough—is
an incentive to avoid malicious behavior from the outset. Participants have to weigh up
whether an action is worth the consequences. Due to its universality, accountability is
applicable to a wide range of protocols, such as e-voting, electronic payment processing,
and electronic health care transactions.
Nevertheless, accountability has long lacked a protocol-agnostic definition in the security
setting. Künnemann, Garg, and Backes [21] propose a general protocol agnostic definition
of accountability in which the fact that a party deviated is considered a potential cause for
a security violation. Based on this approach, Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] provide
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
12
04
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 J
un
 20
20
an automated verification technique in the single-adversary setting. Accountability is
considered as a meta-property with respect to a security property ϕ which indicates when
the security of a protocol is considered violated. A protocol that provides accountability
for ϕ provides the information necessary to determine whether ϕ has been violated and,
if so, which parties should be held accountable. The groups of parties that are jointly
accountable for a violation are given in a verdict. Verdicts are returned by a total
function—the verdict function—given the trace of a protocol execution.
Proving that a specified verdict function provides the protocol with accountability with
respect to a security property requires verifying that a set of verification conditions holds.
Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] show that their proposed verification conditions
are sound and complete: If and only if all conditions hold, accountability is provided.
Expressing the verification conditions as trace properties allows them to use existing
protocol verification tools and achieve a high degree of automation.
However, the verdict function and verification conditions they propose require that
the parties are explicitly stated in each verdict and thus only work with a fixed number
of parties. This limits the expressiveness of the approach as in almost all real-world
protocols, such as TLS, XMPP, and IMAP, the number of participants is not known a
priori and may change dynamically during the protocol execution.
In this work, we address this shortcoming by combining their approach with the
notion of case tests—an idea inspired by the accountability tests of Bruni, Giustolisi,
and Schuermann [19]. Case tests are trace properties with free variables where each free
variable is instantiated with a party that should be blamed for a violation. In contrast
to accountability tests, case tests are able to express joint accountability. The verdict
function can be defined from the case tests as the function that, given a trace, outputs
each set of parties that matches some case test. This approach provides huge flexibility
and allows us to analyze accountability properties of protocols with unbounded sets
of participants. It also improves readability, as, intuitively, each case test stands for a
specific manifestation of a violation, in contrast to the previous, explicit formulation of
the verdict function, in which all combinations of events that constitute a violation had
to be captured.
1.2 Contributions
This work makes the following contributions:
• We derive a set of verdict-based verification conditions based on the accountability
definition of Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] and show that they provide
soundness and completeness.
• We introduce the notion of case tests and use them to define verdict functions
which are significantly more flexible than previous ones.
• We show how the verification conditions can be rewritten using case tests and
formalize requirements to encode them in terms of trace properties. By proving
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equivalence to the verdict-based variant, their soundness and completeness results
are transferred to the encoded verification conditions.
• We have implemented our approach into Tamarin by adding the ability to define
accountability lemmas and case tests. This allows our encoded verification conditions
to be automatically generated and verified.
1.3 Outline
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss related work. Section 3
provides an overview of the notation and concepts used in this work, introduces the
Stateful Applied Pi Calculus (SAPiC), and reviews the accountability definition of
Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22]. In Section 4, we derive a set of verdict-based
verification conditions and provide soundness and completeness proofs. We elucidate the
construction of the verdict functions in Section 5 and show how the verification conditions
can be expressed as trace properties in Section 6. Aspects regarding the implementation
of our approach in Tamarin are described in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
In the security setting considered in this work, we regard accountability as the ability to
identify malicious parties. Different approaches and notions of accountability have been
proposed. However, in previous works, these are only described informally or tailored to
specific protocols and security properties [2], [4], [11], [17]. An emerging problem is the
difficulty of defining when a party’s behavior should be considered malicious and the
implications this has on completeness—holding all malicious parties accountable.1
In the past, misbehaving and dishonest parties were treated as equivalent. While this is
a reasonable approximation for some cryptographic tasks—for example, secure multi-party
computation—it is not suitable in the context of accountability. Completeness would
require identifying all dishonest parties, but a dishonest party does not have to deviate
or behaves in a way that is indistinguishable from the protocol. Some approaches [5], [6]
in the distributed setting assume that all communication is observable and classify any
trace not producible by honest parties as malicious behavior. In the security setting, this
assumption is impossible to satisfy and the definition of malicious behavior unreasonable,
as parties may communicate through hidden channels and deviate in harmless ways.
Haeberlen, Kouznetsov, and Druschel [5] propose PeerReview, a system which can detect
Byzantine faults in the distributed setting. The system requires that all communication
is observable which is a suitable assumption in a distributed environment but unrealistic
in the security setting.
Jagadeesan, Jeffrey, Pitcher, et al. [6] provide multiple general notions of accountability
based on an abstract labeled transition system in the distributed setting. However, the
1 Note that this notion of completeness concerns what we would consider the verdict. This is opposed to
the completeness of the verification conditions with respect to the accountability of a protocol, saying
that all protocols that provide accountability are recognized as correct by the verification conditions.
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authors admit that “the only auditor capable of providing [completeness] is one which
blames all principals who are capable of dishonesty, regardless of whether they acted
dishonestly or not.”
Küsters, Truderung, and Vogt [8] define accountability in the symbolic and computa-
tional model using accountability properties. These are specified in a formal language.
Künnemann, Garg, and Backes [21] point out that these properties are not expressive
enough. Furthermore, they identify significant weaknesses in the case of joint misbehavior.
Another approach is to consider protocol actions as the actual causes for security
violations [9], [15], [16]. However, protocol actions may be causally related to a security
violation but still harmless and without any malicious intent.
In recent work, Künnemann, Garg, and Backes [21] propose a general protocol agnostic
definition of accountability in which the fact that a party deviated is considered a potential
cause for a security violation. Based on this approach, Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes
[22] provide an automated verification technique in the single-adversary setting. They
define the a posteriori verdict(apv), which given a trace of a protocol execution, returns
all groups of parties that are jointly accountable for the security violation. If there exists
a function—called the verdict function—which coincides with the apv for all traces of
the protocol, the verdict function is said to provide the protocol with accountability for
a specified security property. In their work, the verdict function uses a case distinction
over traces and specifies for each case a verdict. This form requires that the parties are
explicitly stated in each verdict and thus only works with a fixed number of parties. This
limits the applicability of the approach as in almost all real-world protocols, such as TLS,
XMPP, and IMAP, the number of participants is not known a priori and may change
dynamically during the protocol execution.
Bruni, Giustolisi, and Schuermann [19] give a definition of accountability based on
the existence of per-party accountability tests which decide whether the party should
be held accountable for a violation. A verdict is obtained by considering all parties for
which their test is positive as singleton sets. Since each singleton verdict contains exactly
one party, joint accountability is not expressible and a severe limitation. Moreover, as
noted by Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22], there are fatal flaws in the criteria of
their definition allowing parties to be blamed even if the security of a protocol cannot be
violated or violations to remain undetected under certain circumstances.
3 Background
In this section, we provide an overview of the notation and concepts we use throughout this
work and provide background on the Stateful Applied Pi Calculus and the accountability
definition of Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22].
3.1 Notation and Concepts
The notations and concepts presented in this section are based on Meier [12] and
Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22].
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Sets, sequences, and multisets The set of natural numbers is denoted by N, the set of
rational numbers by Q, and the set of integers {1, . . . , n} by [n]. Given a set S, we denote
its power set by 2S and the set of finite sequences of elements from S by S∗. For a sequence
s, we write si for the i-th element, |s| for the length of s, and idx(x) :=
{
1, . . . , |s|} for
the set of indices of s. We write ~s to emphasize that s is a sequence. For a set A, we
write A# for the set of finite multisets of elements from A. We use the superscript #
to denote the usual operations on multisets. For example, we write ∅# for the empty
multiset and m1 ∪# m2 for the union of two multisets m1 and m2.
Terms Cryptographic messages are modeled as abstract terms. We specify an order-
sorted term algebra with the sort msg and two incomparable subsorts pub and fresh for
two countably infinite sets of public names (PN ) and fresh names (FN ). We assume
pairwise disjoint, countably infinite sets of variables Vs for each sort s. The set of all
variables V is the union of the set of variables for all sorts Vs. We write u : s when the
name or variable u is of sort s. A signature Σ is a set of function symbols, each with an
arity. We write f/n for a function symbol f with arity n. A subset Σpriv ⊆ Σ consists
of private function symbols which cannot be applied by the adversary. The set of well-
sorted terms constructed over Σ, PN , FN , and V is denoted by TΣ. The subset of ground
terms—terms without variables—is denoted byMΣ. If Σ can be inferred from context,
we write T andM respectively.
Equational theories An equation over the signature Σ is an unordered pair {s, t} of
terms t, s ∈ TΣ, written s w t or s = t if the meaning can be inferred from context.
Equality is defined with respect to an equational theory E, a binary relation =E induced
by a finite set of equations which is closed under application of function symbols, bijective
renaming of names, and substitution of variables by terms of the same sort. An equational
theory E formalizes the semantics of the function symbols in Σ. We say that two terms t
and s are equal modulo E if and only if t =E s. Set membership modulo E is denoted by
∈E and defined as e ∈E S if and only if ∃e′ ∈ S. e′ =E e. The usual operations on sets
modulo E are defined accordingly.
Example 3.1 (Digital signatures). To model cryptographic messages built using digital
signatures, we use the signature
ΣDS = {sig/2, verify/3, pk/1, sk/1, true/0}
and the equational theory EDS generated by the equation
verify
(
sig(m, sk(i)),m, pk(sk(i))
)
= true . ♦
In this work, we assume that the signature Σ and the equational theory E contain
symbols and equations for pairing and projection.{〈·, ·〉, fst/1, snd/1} ⊆ Σ
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with
fst
(〈x, y〉) = x
snd
(〈x, y〉) = y .
Moreover, we write 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 as a shortcut for 〈x1, 〈. . . , 〈xn−1, xn〉 . . . 〉.
Facts We assume an unsorted signature Σfact which is disjoint from Σ. The set of facts
is defined by
F := {F(t1, . . . , tn) ∣∣ ti ∈ T ,F ∈ Σkfact } ,
where Σkfact denotes all function symbols of arity k in Σfact. The set of ground facts is
denoted by G.
Substitutions A substitution σ is a well-sorted function from variables V to terms TΣ
that corresponds to the identity function on all variables except on a finite set of variables.
Overloading notation, we call this finite set of variables the domain of σ, which we denote
by dom(σ). The image of dom(σ) under σ is denoted by rng(σ). For the homomorphic
extension of σ to a term t or a trace formula ϕ, we write tσ and ϕσ respectively. We
write σ
[
v 7→ w] to denote the update of σ at v such that σ(x) = w for x = v and σ(x)
otherwise. If σ is injective, we denote its inverse by σ−1. We say that two substitutions
σ, σ′ are equal modulo E if dom(σ) = dom(σ′) and σ(x) = σ(x′) for all x in dom(σ).
Valuation Each sort s is associated with a domain Ds. The domain for temporal
variables is Dtemp := Q and the domains for messages are Dmsg :=M, Dfresh := FN , and
Dpub := PN . A function θ from V to Q ∪M is a valuation if it respects sorts, that is,
θ(Vs) ⊆ Ds for all sorts s. We write tθ for the homomorphic extension of θ to a term t.
Trace properties Trace properties are sets of traces which are specified by trace for-
mulas in a two-sorted first-order logic which supports quantification over messages and
timepoints.
Definition 3.1 (Trace formula). A trace atom is either false ⊥, a term equality t1 ≈ t2,
a timepoint ordering il j, a timepoint equality i .= j, or an action F@i for a fact F ∈ F
and a timepoint i. A trace formula is a first-order formula over trace atoms.
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Definition 3.2 (Satisfactory relation). The satisfaction relation (tr , θ)  ϕ between a
trace tr , a valuation θ, and a trace formula ϕ is defined as follows.
(tr , θ)  ⊥ never
(tr , θ)  F@i ⇐⇒ θ(i) ∈ idx(tr) ∧ Fθ ∈E trθ(i)
(tr , θ)  il j ⇐⇒ θ(i) < θ(j)
(tr , θ)  i .= j ⇐⇒ θ(i) = θ(j)
(tr , θ)  t1 ≈ t2 ⇐⇒ t1θ =E t2θ
(tr , θ)  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ not (tr , θ)  ϕ
(tr , θ)  ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇐⇒ (tr , θ)  ϕ1 and (tr , θ)  ϕ2
(tr , θ)  ∃x : s. ϕ ⇐⇒ there is u ∈ dom(s)
such that (tr , θ
[
x 7→ u])  ϕ .
For completeness, we define
ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)
∀x : s. ϕ ≡ ¬(∃x : s. ¬ϕ)
ϕ1 =⇒· ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
ϕ1 ⇐⇒· ϕ2 ≡ ϕ1 =⇒· ϕ2 ∧ ϕ2 =⇒· ϕ1
We write t1 = t2, i < j, and i = j if the meaning is clear from context. Timepoints are
used to indicate the position of facts in a trace. The free variables of ϕ are denoted by
fv(ϕ) which may be used as a set or sequence depending on the context. We say ϕ is
a ground formula if it does not contain free variables, that is, fv(ϕ) = ∅. When ϕ is a
ground formula, we may write tr  ϕ since the satisfaction of ϕ is independent of the
valuation. The renaming of the free variables of ϕ by a sequence ~v of equal length is
denoted by ϕ
[
fv(ϕ) 7→ ~v] or simply ϕ[~v]. We write ϕ(~x) to denote that the variables ~x
are bound in ϕ, that is, fv
(
ϕ(~x)
)
= fv(ϕ) \ ~x.
Definition 3.3 (Validity, satisfiability). Let Tr ⊆ be a set of traces. A trace formula ϕ
is valid for Tr , written Tr ∀ ϕ, if and only if (tr , θ)  ϕ for every trace tr ∈ Tr and
every valuation θ. A trace formula ϕ is satisfiable for Tr , written Tr ∃ ϕ, if and only if
there exists a trace tr ∈ Tr and a valuation θ such that (tr , θ)  ϕ.
Note that Tr ∀ ϕ if and only if Tr 6∃ ¬ϕ. Given a ground process P, ϕ is valid for P,
written P ∀ ϕ, if traces(P) ∀ ϕ; ϕ is satisfiable for P, written P ∃ ϕ, if traces(P) ∃ ϕ.
Instantiations An instantiation ρ is a substitution from variables V to ground termsM.
We say that ρ is grounding with respect to a trace formula ϕ if ϕρ is a ground formula.
For two instantiations ρ, ρ′ we only consider equality modulo E and simply write ρ = ρ′.
In particular, all operations involving instantiations are considered modulo E.
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〈P,Q〉 ::= 0
| P |Q
| P + Q
| !P
| vn; P
| out([M ,]N ); P
| in([M ,]N ); P
| if M = N then P [else Q]
| event F; P
| insert M ,N ; P
| delete M ; P
| lookup M as x in P [else Q]
| lock M ; P
| unlock M ; P
〈M ,N 〉 ::= x, y, z ∈ V
| p ∈ PN
| n ∈ FN
| f(M1 , . . . ,Mk), f ∈ Σk
Figure 1: SAPiC syntax
Accountability protocol An accountability protocol is a ground process P with a
countably infinite set of participants A. We assume that A ⊆M, that is, a party can
be any ground term. Due to the huge variety in the design of protocols, we leave the
concrete structure of this process open. However, we require that each party which is
not trusted specifies a corruption procedure that emits a Corrupted event and reveals its
secrets. The set of corrupted parties of a trace t is defined by
corrupted(t) :=
{
A ∈ A ∣∣ Corrupted(A) ∈ t } .
In this work, we implicitly assume an accountability protocol P. If not stated otherwise,
quantification over traces is always with respect to traces(P).
3.2 Stateful Applied Pi Calculus
In this section, we introduce the Stateful Applied Pi Calculus—called SAPiC [14], [18]—
which is an extension to the well-known applied-pi calculus [3]. In addition to the
functionality of the former calculus, SAPiC provides support for accessing and updating
an explicit global state.
In the following, we explain the syntax and semantics of the calculus. The syntax of
SAPiC is shown in Figure 1.
0 The terminal process.
P |Q The parallel execution of the processes P and Q.
P + Q External non-deterministic choice. If P or Q can reduce to a process
P ′ or Q′, P + Q may reduce to either.
!P The replication of P allowing an unbounded number of sessions in
protocol executions. It is equivalent to P | !P.
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vn; P This construct binds the name n ∈ FN in P and models the
generation of a fresh, random value.
out
(
[M ,]N
)
; P
in
(
[M ,]N
)
; P
These constructs represent the output and input of message N
on channel N respectively. The channel argument is optional and
defaults to the public channel c. In contrast to the applied-pi
calculus [3], SAPiC’s input construct performs pattern matching
instead of variable binding.
if M = N then
P [else Q]
If M =E N , this process reduces to P and otherwise to Q. The
else-branch is optional and defaults to the 0 process.
event F; P This construct leaves the action fact F in the trace of the process
execution which is useful in the definition of trace formulas.
insert M ,N ; P This construct associates the key M with the value N . An insert
to an existing key overwrites the old value.
delete M ; P This construct removes the value associated to the key M .
lookup M as x in
P [else Q]
This construct retrieves the value associated to the key M and binds
it to x in P. If no value has been associated withM , it reduces to Q.
lock M ; P
unlock M ; P
These constructs protect a termM from concurrent access similar to
Dijkstra’s binary semaphores. If M has been locked, any subsequent
attempt to lock M will be blocked until M has been unlocked. This
is important if parallel processes read and modify shared state.
Frames and deduction During a protocol execution, the adversary may compute new
messages from observed ones. This is formalized by a deduction relation and a frame.
A frame, denoted by vn˜.σ, consists of a set of fresh names n˜ and a substitution σ. The
fresh names are the secrets generated by the protocol which are a priori unknown to the
adversary and the substitution represents the observed messages. The deduction rules of
Figure 2 allow the adversary
• to learn a free or public name if it is not a secret (Dname),
• to obtain a message in the substitution (Dframe),
• to derive a term equal modulo E to an already deduced term (Deq), or
• to apply a non-private function to already deduced terms (Dappl).
Definition 3.4 (Deduction). The deduction relation vn˜.σ ` t is defined as the smallest
relation between frames and terms according to the deduction rules in Figure 2.
9
a ∈ FN a /∈ n˜
vn˜.σ ` a Dname
vn˜.σ ` t t =E t ′
vn˜.σ ` t ′ Deq
x ∈ dom(σ)
vn˜.σ ` xσ Dframe
vn˜.σ ` t1 . . . vn˜.σ ` tk f ∈ Σk \ Σkpriv
vn˜.σ ` f(t1 , . . . , tk)
Dappl
Figure 2: Deduction relation
Operational semantics The semantics of SAPiC are defined by a labeled transition
relation between process configurations. A process configuration is a 5-tuple (X ,S,P, σ,L)
where
• X ∈ FN is the set of fresh names generated by the processes;
• S : MΣ →MΣ is a partial function modeling the store;
• P is a multiset of ground processes representing the processes executed in parallel;
• σ is a ground substitution modeling the messages output to the environment;
• L ⊆MΣ is the set of currently active locks.
The transition relation is specified by the rules shown in Table 1. Transitions are
labeled by sets of ground facts. Reducing a processes means that it can transition from
a configuration c to a configuration c′ with a set of facts {F1, . . . ,Fn} which is denoted
by c {F1,...,Fn}−−−−−−−→ c′. Empty sets and brackets around singleton sets are omitted for
clarity. We write −−→ for ∅−−→ and f−−→ for {f}−−→. An execution is a sequence of consecutive
configurations c1 F1−−→ . . . Fn−−→ cn. The trace of an execution is the sequence of nonempty
facts Fi. The reflexive, transitive closure of −−→, which are the transitions labeled by the
empty sets, is denoted by −−→∗ and f==⇒ denotes −−→∗ f−−→−−→∗. The set of traces of a
process P contains all traces of possible executions of the process.
Definition 3.5 (Traces of P). Given a ground process P, the traces of P are defined by
traces
(
P
)
=
{ (
F1, . . . ,Fn
) ∣∣∣ c0 F1==⇒ . . . Fn==⇒ cn } ,
where c0 =
(∅, ∅, {P}, ∅, ∅) is the initial process configuration.
3.3 A Definition of Accountability
In this section, we review the accountability definition of Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes
[22] in the symbolic model. Their approach is protocol and framework-agnostic and only
requires that trace properties can be evaluated and the set of dishonest parties determined.
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Current Configuration (ci) Label Next Configuration (ci+1)
P ∪# {0} −−→ P
P ∪# {P |Q} −−→ P ∪# {P,Q}
P ∪# {!P} −−→ P ∪# {P, !P}
P ∪# {vn; P} −−→ X ∪ {n
′}
P ∪# {P{n′/n}} if n
′ is fresh
P K(M)−−−−→ P if vX .σ ` M
P ∪# {out
(
M ,N
)
; P} K(M)−−−−→ P ∪
# {P}
σ ∪ {N/x}
if x is fresh
and vX .σ ` M
P ∪# {in
(
M ,N
)
; P} K(〈M,Nγ〉)−−−−−−−−→ P ∪# {Pγ} if vX .σ ` M , vX .σ ` Nγ
and γ is grounding for N
P ∪# {out
(
M ,N
)
; P, in
(
M ′,N ′
)
; Q} −−→ P ∪# {P,Qγ} if M =E M
′ and N =E N ′γ
and γ is grounding for N ′
P ∪# {if pr(M1 , . . . ,Mn) then P else Q} −−→
P ∪# {P} if φpr{M1/x1 , . . . ,Mn/xn}
P ∪# {Q} otherwise
P ∪# {event F; P} F−−→ P
P ∪# {insert M ,N ; P} −−→ S
[
M 7→ N
]
P ∪# {P}
P ∪# {delete M ; P} −−→ S
[
M 7→ ⊥
]
P ∪# {P}
P ∪# {lookup M as x in P else Q; P} −−→
P ∪# {P{V/x}} if S(N ) =E V is defined
and N =E M
P ∪# {Q} if S(N ) is undefined
for all N =E M
P ∪# {lock M ; P} −−→ P ∪
# {P}
L ∪ {M} if M /∈E L
P ∪# {unlock M ; P} −−→ P ∪
# {P}
L \ {M ′ |M ′ =E M}
Table 1: Operational semantics of SAPiC
11
Holding parties in a protocol accountable for their behavior requires a precise definition
of what it means for the protocol to be secure. This is formalized by a security property
which is expressed as a trace property ϕ. To allow any meaningful analysis, there
have to be at least two traces, one satisfying and one violating the security property.
Following intuition, if all parties adhere to the protocol, the security property ϕ must
hold. Otherwise, either the protocol or ϕ are ill-defined. If a violation occurred, indicated
by ¬ϕ, at least one party must have deviated from the protocol. Each party is either
honest and follows the protocol or dishonest and may deviate from its specified behavior.
The definition assumes a single adversary controlling all dishonest parties. For an honest
party to become dishonest, it has to receive a corruption message from the adversary. A
corrupted party stays dishonest for the rest of the protocol execution. We may refer to
parties as dishonest or corrupted interchangeably throughout this work.
A dishonest party does not have to deviate and may behave in a way that is indis-
tinguishable from the protocol. It is thus impossible to detect all dishonest parties.
Furthermore, parties may deviate by communicating through hidden channels and thus
it is also impossible to detect all deviating parties. Instead, the definition of Künnemann,
Esiyok, and Backes [22] is based on sufficient causation [15], [20] and focusses on parties
that are the actual cause of a violation. This requires that protocols are defined in such
a way that deviating parties leave publicly observable evidence for security violations. In
this sense, a protocol provides accountability with respect to ϕ if we can determine all
parties for which the fact that they are deviating at all is a cause for the violation of ϕ.
Assume an countably infinite set of parties A.2 Deviations of a set of parties S ⊆ A
are a cause for a violation if and only if
SC1: A violation occurred and the parties in S deviated.
SC2: If all deviating parties, except those in S, would have behaved honestly, the same
violation would still occur.
SC3: S is minimal; SC1 and SC2 hold for no strict subset of S.
SC1 ensures that a violation has occurred and the parties in S deviated. SC2 ensures
that the parties in S are sufficient to cause a violation. There may be other deviating
parties not in S, but their deviation has no influence on the violation. In this vein, SC2
describes a situation which differs from the actual observed events—called a counterfactual.
SC3 ensures that only minimal sets S are considered, that is, we always hold the least
amount of parties accountable.
Example 3.2. Consider a protocol in which access to a central user database is logged
and request must be signed. A violation occurs whenever user data is leaked. The parties
involved are a manager M and two employees E1 and E2. The manager can directly sign
a request to get access to the database and can thus cause a violation on its own. For
the employees to gain access, both need to sign a request. Assume this is the case and a
leak occurs. Then E1 and E2 are jointly accountable. In the counterfactual scenarios in
which only E1 or E2 deviates, a violation is not possible and thus SC2 is not satisfied.
2This is a difference to Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] where a finite set of parties is assumed.
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If parties M and E1 cause a violation, then SC1 and SC2 hold. However, as M can
cause a violation on its own which also satisfies SC1 and SC2, SC3 does not hold. ♦
The counterfactual situations considered in SC2 cannot be chosen arbitrarily. They
have to be related to the actual situation to obtain meaningful and justifiable results.
This relationship is specified by a counterfactual relation r. If (t, t′) ∈ r, also written as
r(t, t′), then the counterfactual trace t′ is related to the actual trace t. In this sense, it is
a natural requirement for r to be reflexive and transitive.
The relation has to satisfy one more condition. The parties corrupted in the counter-
factual trace must also have been corrupted in the actual trace.
r(t, t′) =⇒ corrupted(t′) ⊆ corrupted(t) . (1)
Intuitively, parties which are only corrupted in the counterfactual trace should not be
causally relevant for a security violation in the actual trace.
The a posteriori verdict (apv) specifies for a given trace all minimal subsets of parties
that are sufficient to cause a security violation.
Definition 3.6 (A posteriori verdict). Let P be a protocol, t a trace, ϕ a security property,
and r a relation on traces. The a posteriori verdict is defined by
apvP,ϕ,r(t) :=
{
S
∣∣∣ t  ¬ϕ (Req. 1)
∧ ∃ t′. r(t, t′) ∧ corrupted(t′) = S ∧ t′  ¬ϕ (Req. 2)
∧ @ t′′. r(t, t′′) ∧ corrupted(t′′) ( S ∧ t′′  ¬ϕ
}
(Req. 3)
We may leave out any of the subscripts if they can be inferred from context. The
output of the apv is called a verdict.
Example 3.3. In the situation of Example 3.2, the following verdicts may be returned
by the apv:
∅ The empty verdict—no violation and no parties to blame.{{M}} The manager leaked the data on its own.{{E1, E2}} The employees colluded to leak the data.{{M}, {E1, E2}} The manager as well as the employees leaked the data. ♦
Each set S ∈ apvP,ϕ,r(t) satisfies SC1, SC2, and SC3. Requirement 1 ensures that a
violation occurred and therefore at least one party in S deviated in t. If not all parties in
S would deviate, there would be a counterfactual trace t′′ where a strict subset of S would
deviate, thereby violating Requirement 3. Hence, SC1 is satisfied. SC2 is captured by
Requirement 2, which ensures that there exists a counterfactual trace t′, showing that the
parties in S are sufficient to cause a violation. SC3 follows directly from Requirement 3.
The following corollary shows that accountability with respect to ϕ implies verifiability
of ϕ. If no violation occurred, no parties are blamed. If no parties are blamed, no
violation occurred.
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Corollary 3.7. For all traces t
apvP,ϕ,r(t) = ∅ ⇐⇒ t  ϕ .
Proof. Assume t  ϕ. Then apvP,ϕ,r(t) = ∅ follows by Definition 3.6.
Assume t  ¬ϕ. As r is reflexive, Requirement 2 holds for t and S = corrupted(t). If S
is already minimal, there does not exist a trace t′′ which corrupts a strict subset of S and
thus apvP,ϕ,r(t) = {S} 6= ∅. If S is not minimal, there exists a trace t′′ which corrupts
S′ ( S. The counterfactual trace t′ can then be instantiated with t′′ and S′. If S′ is not
minimal, this step can be repeated until a minimal set S? is obtained. As the cardinality
of the sets decreases in each step, this approach is guaranteed to terminate. 
The apv can only be computed after the fact, that is, it requires full knowledge of
the actual trace t. The task of an accountability protocol is to always compute the apv
without this information. To abstract from the apv, a total function, the verdict function
verdict(t) : traces(P)→ 22A (2)
is introduced.
Accountability is now defined in terms of the apv and the verdict function. If the apv
coincides for all traces with the verdict function, the latter provides the protocol with
accountability for a security property ϕ.
Definition 3.8 (Accountability). A verdict function verdict provides a protocol P with
accountability for a security property ϕ with respect to a relation r, if
∀ t ∈ traces(P). verdict(t) = apvP,ϕ,r(t) . (AccverdictP,ϕ,r )
Remark 3.9 (Counterfactual relation). Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] note that
there is no consensus in the causality literature about how actual and counterfactual
scenarios should relate. They propose three approaches for relating actual and coun-
terfactual traces: By control-flow, by kind of violation, and the weakest relation with
respect to (1). We take a closer look at the relations in Section 6.4.
4 Verifying Accountability
The definition of accountability (Definition 3.8) requires that the apv coincides with a
given verdict function for all traces of the protocol. Since the apv can only be computed
after the fact and the number of traces is most often infinite, this coincidence cannot be
shown directly. However, the definition of the apv imposes multiple requirements on the
verdicts returned by the verdict function. In this section, we describe these requirements
explicitly in the form of verification conditions and show that they are sound and
complete. Soundness allows us to prove that a verdict function provides a protocol with
accountability by verifying that all conditions hold. Completeness ensures that if a verdict
function provides a protocol with accountability, then the verification conditions hold.
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This approach allows us to abstract the apv and only work with the verification
conditions. In future sections, we show how they can be translated into a form which
can be automatically verified using existing protocol verification tools.
4.1 Verification Conditions
We first impose a condition on the counterfactual relation which is in line with (1). If a
counterfactual trace t′ is related to an actual trace t and the security property is violated
in the former, then it has to be violated in the latter.
r(t, t′) ∧ t′  ¬ϕ =⇒ t  ¬ϕ . (3)
Intuitively, if there is no violation in the actual trace, then it does not make sense to
consider counterfactual traces where a violation occurs.
With this condition, we can prove an interesting but natural lemma, which we will use
in the soundness proof of the verification conditions. Assume actual and counterfactual
traces t, t′ are related and S′ is a set in apv(t′). Then there exists a subset of S which is
in apv(t).
Lemma 4.1. For all traces t, t′
r(t, t′) ∧ S′ ∈ apv(t′) =⇒ ∃S. S ∈ apv(t) ∧ S ⊆ S′ .
Proof by contradiction. Assume r(t, t′), S′ ∈ apv(t′) and there does not exist S ∈ apv(t)
such that S ⊆ S′. From the latter follows S′ /∈ apv(t). For this to be the case, at least
one of the three requirements in Definition 3.6 has to be violated. Since S′ ∈ apv(t′), we
have t′  ¬ϕ. From (3) follows with r(t, t′) that t  ¬ϕ. Thus Requirement 1 is satisfied.
As S′ ∈ apv(t′), there exists a trace t? such that
t?  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t?) = S′ ∧ r(t′, t?) .
With r(t, t′) follows r(t, t?) and thus Requirement 2 is fulfilled. Therefore, Requirement 3
cannot hold. Let t′′ be such that S = corrupted(t′′) is minimal. Then S ∈ apv(t) and
S ( S′. However, this contradicts our assumption that no such set exists. 
It may seem unintuitive that for each set of parties in the apv of the counterfactual
trace a subset of this set must exist in the apv of the actual trace. We note that the
minimality requirement of the apv is weaker in the counterfactual trace than in the actual
trace. The traces related to t′ are a subset of the traces related to t and thus there may
be a trace related to t showing that a set S is not minimal but this trace is not necessarily
related to t′.
From Requirement 3 of the apv, we derive that the apv does not contain two sets
where one is a strict subset of the other.
Corollary 4.2. For all traces t and sets S
S ∈ apv(t) =⇒ @S′. S′ ∈ apv(t) ∧ S′ ( S . (4)
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Proof by contradiction. Assume (4) does not hold. Then there exist S, S′ ∈ apv(t) with
S′ ( S. From S′ ∈ apv(t) follows the existence of a trace t′ such that
t′  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t′) = S′ ∧ r(t, t′) .
As S′ ( S this violates Requirement 3 with respect to S. 
In the following, we describe the verification conditions imposed by the apv and thus a
verdict function has to satisfy.
Verifiability (Vϕ) This condition follows directly from Corollary 3.7.
∀ t. verdict(t) = ∅ ⇐⇒ t  ϕ
We require that whenever the verdict function returns an empty verdict, the security
property holds.
Minimality (MS) This conditions follows directly from Corollary 4.2.
∀ t. S ∈ verdict(t) =⇒ @S′. S′ ∈ verdict(t) ∧ S′ ( S
We require that the verdict does not contain a strict subset of one of its sets. Intuitively,
the condition ensures that we only blame the least amount of parties which caused a
violation.
Sufficiency (SFS) This condition is similar to Requirement 2 and guarantees that each
set of parties in a verdict is sufficient to cause a violation on their own.
∀ t. S ∈ verdict(t) =⇒ ∃ t′. verdict(t′) = {S} ∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ S ∧ r(t, t′)
For each set of parties in a verdict, there exists a related trace in which only a subset of
these parties has been corrupted and for which the verdict function returns a singleton
verdict only blaming these parties.
We could also define a slightly stronger sufficiency condition where we would re-
quire equality between the set of corrupted parties and the set in the verdict, that is,
corrupted(t′) = S. Instead, we capture this requirement in its own condition—uniqueness.3
With this approach, we get more precise information when a condition does not hold.
Uniqueness (US) This condition guarantees that all parties in a verdict have been
corrupted; or worded differently, no honest parties are blamed for a security violation.
∀ t. S ∈ verdict(t) =⇒ S ⊆ corrupted(t)
3 The name goes back to the case distinction used in the verdict function of Künnemann, Esiyok, and
Backes [22], in which the condition ensures that only a unique, sufficient, and minimal verdict exists
for each case.
16
We write SF, Vϕ, M, and U, if the respective condition holds for all S. We denote the
conjunction of these conditions by VCϕ or simply by VC if the security property can be
inferred from context.
Example 4.1. Consider the protocol described in Example 3.2 with the following verdict
function.
verdict(t) =

{{M}} if ∃ i. Access(M)@i{{E1, E2}} if ∃ i. Access(〈E1, E2〉)@i
∅ otherwise
(5)
To prove that this verdict function provides accountability for not leaking data, we
have to verify that the verdict function is indeed total and that all verification conditions
hold. The former follows directly from (5). For the latter, one would show the following.
SFS : Knowing the signing key of the parties in the verdict is sufficient to leak the data.
Vϕ: If no party accesses the data (the otherwise case in (5)), no data can be leaked.
MS : Without any signing key or only the signing key of a single employee, the data
cannot be leaked.
US : Accessing and leaking the data requires corrupting the respective parties.
♦
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we show that the verification conditions derived in the previous section
are sound and complete with respect to Definition 3.8.
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness). For any protocol P, security property ϕ, and verdict function
verdict, if VC holds, then verdict provides P with accountability for ϕ.
Proof. Assume VC holds. We show that for all traces t, apv(t) = verdict(t). Let t be an
arbitrary trace.
From Corollary 3.7 and Vϕ directly follows apv(t) = ∅ ⇐⇒ verdict(t) = ∅. Hence,
we only have to consider nonempty verdicts in the following. The proof consists of two
parts. We first show that apv(t) ⊆ verdict(t) and then verdict(t) ⊆ apv(t).
Assume S ∈ apv(t). To show that S ∈ verdict(t), we have to prove that S satisfies
SFS , MS , and US .
SFS : From S ∈ apv(t) follows the existence of a trace t′ such that
t′  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t′) = S ∧ r(t, t′) .
It suffices to show that verdict(t′) =
{
S
}
. From Vϕ and t′  ¬ϕ follows verdict(t′) 6=
∅. Assume |verdict(t′)| > 2. Then there exist S?, S?? such that {S?, S??} ⊆
verdict(t′) and S? 6= S??. By SFS? and SFS?? , there exist traces t?, t?? such that
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verdict(t?) =
{
S?
} ∧ corrupted(t?) ⊆ S? ∧ r(t′, t?)
verdict(t??) =
{
S??
} ∧ corrupted(t??) ⊆ S?? ∧ r(t′, t??) .
From US? and r(t′, t?) follows S? ⊆ S. From US?? and r(t′, t??) follows S?? ⊆ S. Since
S? 6= S??, either S? ( S or S?? ( S. However, as S ∈ apv(t), r(t, t?), and r(t, t??),
this would violate the minimality of S. Thus S? = S?? = S and verdict(t′) =
{
S
}
.
MS : Assume MS does not hold. Then there exists S′ ∈ verdict(t) such that S′ ( S. We
argue that S′ ∈ apv(t) by showing that all three requirements of Definition 3.6 are
satisfied. By SFS′ , there exists a trace t′ such that
verdict(t′) =
{
S′
} ∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ S′ ∧ r(t, t′) .
From US′ follows S′ ⊆ corrupted(t′) and thus corrupted(t′) = S′. From Vϕ follows
t′  ¬ϕ. Thus t′ satisfies Requirement 2. Since S ∈ apv(t), Requirement 1 is also
satisfied. If Requirement 3 would not be fulfilled, then there would exist a trace t′′
such that
t′′  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t′′) ( S′ ∧ r(t, t′′) .
As S′ ( S, this would violate the minimality of S. Thus Requirement 3 holds and
S′ ∈ apv(t). However, this violates Corollary 4.2.
US : By Definition 3.6, there exists a trace t′ such that corrupted(t′) = S and r(t, t′).
From (1) follows S ⊆ corrupted(t).
We now consider the reverse direction. Assume S ∈ verdict(t). To show that S ∈ apv(t),
we have to prove that S satisfies Requirements 1 to 3 of the apv.
Requirement 1: From Vϕ directly follows t  ¬ϕ.
Requirement 2: By SFS , there exists a trace t′ such that
verdict(t′) =
{
S
} ∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ S ∧ r(t, t′) .
From US follows S ⊆ corrupted(t′) and thus corrupted(t′) = S. From Vϕ follows t′  ¬ϕ.
Hence, t′ satisfies Requirement 2.
Requirement 3: Assume the requirement does not hold. Then there exists a trace t′
such that
t′  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t′) ( S ∧ r(t, t′) .
Let t′ be minimal with respect to S′ = corrupted(t′). Then S′ ∈ apv(t′) and S′ ( S.
Since r(t, t′), by Lemma 4.1, there exists S′′ ∈ apv(t) such that S′′ ⊆ S′. In the former
proof, we already showed that this implies S′′ ∈ verdict(t). However, as S′′ ( S this
violates MS . 
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Theorem 4.4 (Completeness). For any protocol P, security property ϕ, and verdict
function verdict, if verdict provides P with accountability for ϕ, then VC holds.
Proof. Assume that for all traces t, apv(t) = verdict(t). We have to show that VC holds.
Let t be an arbitrary trace. Vϕ follows from apv(t) = verdict(t) and Corollary 3.7. Hence,
we only have to consider nonempty verdicts in the following.
Assume S ∈ apv(t) and thus S ∈ verdict(t).
SFS : From S ∈ apv(t) follows the existence of a trace t′ such that
t′  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t′) = S ∧ r(t, t′) .
It suffices to show that verdict(t′) =
{
S
}
. If verdict(t′) = ∅ and thus apv(t′) = ∅,
then t′  ¬ϕ which would violate Corollary 3.7. Assume |verdict(t′)| > 2. Then
there exist S?, S?? such that
{
S?, S??
} ⊆ apv(t′) and S? 6= S??. By Definition 3.6,
there exist traces t?, t?? such that
t?  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t?) = S? ∧ r(t′, t?)
t??  ¬ϕ ∧ corrupted(t??) = S?? ∧ r(t′, t??) .
From r(t′, t?) follows S? ⊆ S and from r(t′, t??) follows S?? ⊆ S. Since S? 6= S??,
either S? ( S or S?? ( S. However, as S ∈ apv(t) and r(t, t?), r(t, t??), this would
violate the minimality of S. Thus S? = S?? = S and verdict(t′) =
{
S
}
. Hence, SFS
holds.
MS : MS follows from apv(t) = verdict(t) and Corollary 4.2.
US : By Definition 3.6, there exists a trace t′ such that corrupted(t′) = S and r(t, t′).
From (1) follows S ⊆ corrupted(t). 
5 Verdict Functions for Unbounded Sets of Participants
In almost all real-world protocols, such as TLS, XMPP, and IMAP, the number of
participants is not known a priori and may change dynamically during the protocol
execution. The structure of verdict functions proposed by Künnemann, Esiyok, and
Backes [22] and exemplified in Example 4.1 is too limited to adequately analyze these
protocols, since all parties must be explicitly stated in the verdict. In this section, we
elucidate the construction of verdict functions based on the notion of case tests—an idea
inspired by the accountability tests of Bruni, Giustolisi, and Schuermann [19]—suitable
for protocols with unbounded sets of participants.
The building block of the verdict functions are case tests. Case tests are trace properties
with free variables, where each free variable is instantiated with a party that should be
blamed for a violation. We may consider each case test as a possible attack to violate
the security property. To be well-defined, we require that each case test has at least one
free variable and there exists at least one trace where a matching instantiation exists.
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Definition 5.1 (Case test). A trace property τ is a case test if and only if
1. |fv(τ)| > 1 ,
2. ∃ t, ρ. t  τρ .
We say a case test τ matches a trace t if there exists an instantiation ρ such that
t  τρ. We simply say a case test τ matches if the trace can be inferred from context.
We define a verdict function with respect to a set of case tests. The verdicts given by
this verdict function contain all sets of instantiated free variables of the case tests that
match a given trace.
Definition 5.2 (Verdict function). Let C be a set of case tests. The verdict function
induced by C is given by
verdictC(t) :=
⋃
τ∈C
{
fv(τ)ρ
∣∣∣ ∃ρ. t  τρ} , (6)
where the union is modulo an equational theory E.
In the following, we assume a fixed set of user-defined case tests which is denoted by
C = τ1, . . . , τn and simply write verdict(t).
Example 5.1. Consider the protocol described in Example 3.2 in the multi-session
setting, that is, there may be multiple managers, employees, and data leaks. There are
two ways a data leak may be caused. Either by a manager or by two colluding employees.
We want to hold all groups of parties accountable which are responsible for a leak. In
contrast to the single-session setting, the protocol must now provide evidence which
group of parties leaked the data. Only knowing the parties which accessed the data is
not sufficient to identify the parties responsible for a violation. In the case of a single
violation, we would suspect all groups of parties that accessed the data.
The security property indicates that neither a manager nor employees leaked the data.
ϕ := @m, ei, ej , data, i. LeakManager(m, data)@i
∨ LeakEmployees(ei , ej , data)@i
Since there are two ways to violate this property where parties with different roles
should be held accountable, we define the following two case tests.
τ1 := ∃data, i. LeakManager(m, data)@i
τ2 := ∃data, i. LeakEmployees(ei , ej , data)@i
We note that the identities of the manager and employees are free in τ1 and τ2. Given
a trace t where two managers M1, M2 and each pair of employees E1, E2, E3 caused a
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violation, the following instantiations exist for τ1 and τ2.
ρ
(1)
1 =
[
m 7→M1
]
ρ
(2)
1 =
[
m 7→M2
]
ρ
(1)
2 =
[
ei 7→ E1, ej 7→ E2
]
ρ
(2)
2 =
[
ei 7→ E2, ej 7→ E3
]
ρ
(3)
2 =
[
ei 7→ E1, ej 7→ E3
]
We obtain all singleton verdicts of the trace by applying the instantiations to the free
variables of the case tests. Hence, the complete verdict is
verdict(t) =
{{M1}, {M2}, {E1, E2}, {E2, E3}, {E1, E3}} . ♦
We use the following corollary to justify switching between the verdict-based notation
of Section 4 and the notation based on case test of this section.
Corollary 5.3. For all traces t
S ∈ verdict(t) ⇐⇒ ∃ i, ρ. t  τiρ ∧ fv(τi)ρ = S .
Proof. The claim follows directly from Definition 5.2. 
By Definition 5.2, we can assign each trace the set of case tests with their corresponding
satisfying instantiations.
Λ(t) :=
⋃
i∈[n]
{
(τi, ρ)
∣∣ ∃ρ. t  τiρ} . (7)
We call a trace t single-matched if |Λ(t)| = 1. We note that Λ(t) contains all the
information to compute the verdict for the trace t. Hence, from Definition 5.2 follows
directly
Λ(t′) ⊆ Λ(t) =⇒ verdict(t′) ⊆ verdict(t) . (8)
However, it also captures more details since the same set in the verdict may be produced
by multiple case tests and instantiations. A point which will become important in the
next section where we will rewrite the verification conditions of Section 4 using case tests.
Example 5.2. In the situation of Example 5.1, we obtain
Λ(t) =
{
(τ1, ρ(1)1 ), (τ1, ρ
(2)
1 ), (τ2, ρ
(1)
2 ), (τ2, ρ
(2)
2 ), (τ2, ρ
(3)
2 )
}
. ♦
6 Verification Conditions as Trace Properties
The results of Section 4 provide us with a sound and complete technique to analyze
the accountability properties of a protocol. However, proving the verification conditions
manually is infeasible due to the inherent complex interactions that are possible even in
apparently simple protocols. Instead, we strive for a solution that achieves a high degree
of automation and thus reduces manual work to a minimum. A promising approach is
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to encode the verification conditions as trace properties, which can then be verified by
existing protocol verification tools like Tamarin [13].
In this section, we first instantiate the verification conditions of Section 4 with the
verdict functions of Section 5 to rewrite the conditions using case tests. We then formalize
requirements we need to encode this intermediate representation as trace properties.
Finally, we prove soundness and completeness by showing their equivalence to the verdict-
based verification conditions.
In the end, as we will show in Section 7, this approach allows us to analyze accountability
properties of protocols with unbounded sets of parties in an highly automatic way.
6.1 Intermediate Representation
In this subsection, we show how to rewrite the verification conditions using case tests
and thus obtain an intermediate representation which will bring us one step closer to our
goal—trace properties. We first apply Corollary 5.3 to each occurrence of S ∈ verdict(t)
and verdict(t) =
{
S
}
in the conditions. Since the original conditions are parameterized
by S, the resulting conditions are parameterized by a case test τi and an instantiation ρ.
We reparameterize these conditions with a case test τi by introducing quantifiers for the
instantiations. As the set of case tests is finite, we also replace quantification over case
tests by conjunctions and disjunctions. For an instantiation ρ, we have
∃ i. t  τiρ ⇐⇒
∨
i∈[n]
t  τiρ , (9)
and
∀ i. t  τiρ ⇐⇒
∧
i∈[n]
t  τiρ . (10)
Moreover, we split the equivalence in the verifiability condition Vϕ. This step is not a
technical requirement, but we may gain more insights when a condition does not hold.
Finally, we obtain the following intermediate representation.
Sufficiency (SFinτi) Assume a case test matches a trace t. Then there exists a related
trace t′ in which only the instantiated parties are corrupted. Moreover, if multiple case
tests match, all sets of instantiated parties have to be the same. This ensures that the
verdict is a singleton.
∀ t, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒ ∃ t′.
[ ∧
j∈[n]
∀ρ′. t′  τjρ′ =⇒ fv(τi)ρ = fv(τj)ρ′
]
∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ fv(τi)ρ
∧ r(t, t′)
Verifiability Empty (VEinϕ ) The condition requires that if there is no case test that
matches, then the security property holds. This ensures a form of completeness of the
case tests in the sense that the security of the protocol can only be violated in the ways
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described by the case tests.
∀ t.
[ ∧
i∈[n]
@ρ. t  τiρ
]
=⇒ t  ϕ
Verifiability Nonempty (VNEinϕ,τi) The conditions requires that if a case test matches,
then the security property is violated. This ensures a form of soundness of the case tests
in the sense that each case test describes a way to violate the security of a protocol.
∀ t, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒ t  ¬ϕ
Minimality (Minτi) The condition ensures that when a case test matches, then no other
case test matches with a strict subset of the instantiated parties.
∀ t, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒
∧
j∈[n]
@ρ′. t  τjρ′ ∧ fv(τj)ρ′ ( fv(τi)ρ
Uniqueness (Uinτi) The condition requires that the instantiated parties of a case test have
been corrupted. This ensures that we do not blame honest parties for a security violation.
∀ t, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒ fv(τi)ρ ⊆ corrupted(t)
6.2 Towards Trace Properties
To encode the intermediate representation of the verification conditions in terms of trace
properties we need some requirements and building blocks, which we elucidate in this
section.
In the following, let ~a = (a1, . . . , am) and ~b = (b1, . . . , bn). The strict subset operator
in Minτi can be expressed by0
~a ( ~b
8
:=
[ ∧
i∈[m]
∨
j∈[n]
ai = bj
]
∧
[ ∨
j∈[n]
∧
i∈[m]
bj 6= ai
]
. (11)
Corruption of a party A is recorded as an action Corrupted(A)@i in the trace. Hence,
the subsets in SFinτi and Uinτi can be expressed for a trace t by
corrupted(t) ⊆ ~a ⇐⇒ t  0Corrupted ⊆ ~a8 (12)
~a ⊆ corrupted(t) ⇐⇒ t  0~a ⊆ Corrupted8 (13)
where 0
Corrupted ⊆ ~a8 := ∀x, k. Corrupted(x)@k =⇒· ∨
i∈[m]
x = ai
0
~a ⊆ Corrupted8 := ∧
i∈[m]
∃k. Corrupted(ai)@k .
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These encodings allow us to express all conditions except one as trace property: SFinτi .
The sufficiency condition has two particularities. First, it is of the form ∀ t. ∃ t′. γ(t, t′),
which denotes a hyperproperty [7]. Since hyperproperties are more expressive than trace
properties, they cannot be directly converted to the latter. Second, it is the only condition
that contains the counterfactual relation r.
To derive a trace property, we need to get rid of the outermost universal quantifier and
abstract the relation r. For this, we take only the consequent of SFinτi and modify it by
requiring a single-matched trace instead of a trace with a singleton verdict and omit the
relation. We will later explain how the relation can be reintroduced. With these changes,
we have
∃ t, ρ. Λ(t) = {(τi, ρ)} ∧ corrupted(t) ⊆ fv(τi)ρ . (14)
We can express that a trace is single-matched as a trace property.
Single-matched (SMτi) For a trace t to be singe-matched, three conditions have to be
satisfied. First, τi has to match t; second, if it matches multiple times, then all variable
assignments have to be equal; and finally, no other case test may match t.
Λ(t) =
{
(τi, ρ)
} ⇐⇒ t  0SMτi8 ,
where 0
SMτi
8
:= ∃~v. τi
[
~v
] ∧ [∀ ~w. τi[~w] =⇒· ~w = ~v]
∧
[ ∧
j∈[n]\{i}
@~x. τj
[
~x
]]
.
We write SM if SMτi holds for all i ∈ [n].
With SMτi and (12), we can express (14) as a trace property. However, we note that
(14) only guarantees the existence of a single trace for each case test and not for all
possible instantiations. To recover the expressiveness lost by dropping the universal
quantifier, we need to ensure that if (14) holds for a single instantiation, then it also holds
for all possible instantiation. To achieve this, we first introduce the replacement property.
Replacement Property (RPτi) For all traces t, t′, and instantiations ρ, ρ′
t  τiρ ∧ Λ(t′) =
{
(τi, ρ′)
}
=⇒
∃ t′′. Λ(t′′) = {(τi, ρ)} ∧ corrupted(t′′) = corrupted(t′)(ρ ◦ ρ′−1) .
where ρ′ is injective. We write RP if RPτi holds for all i ∈ [n].
Assume that we have a witness (a trace t) which shows that a case test matches with a
certain instantiation and a single-matched trace t′ with the same case test but a possibly
different instantiation. Then the property states that there exists a single-matched trace
t′′ with the same case test and instantiation as the witness t, where the corrupted parties
of t′ are replaced with the parties from the former instantiation. Intuitively, the property
enforces a kind of independence of the case tests from the instantiated parties. If there
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exists a single-matched trace for one instantiation, then there has to exist single-matched
traces for all possible instantiation. The existence of a single-matched trace can be
guaranteed by SMτi . In other words, SM and RP ensure that there is a decomposition of
each trace that separates interleaving causally relevant events so they can be regarded in
isolation.
Injectivity of ρ′ ensures that ρ′−1 is single-valued. Consider the non-injective instantia-
tion ρ =
[
x 7→ A, y 7→ A]. Then ρ−1 = [A 7→ x,A 7→ y] is not a valid instantiation. Case
tests should be defined such that non-injective instantiations are not possible, that is,
each free variable has to be instantiated with a distinct value. We can check if a case
test satisfies this condition by expressing it as a trace property.
Instantiation Injective (IIτi)
IIτi ⇐⇒ ∀ t. t 
0
IIτi
8
where 0
IIτi
8
:= ∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ∧
i∈idx(~v)
∧
j∈idx(~v)
j 6=i
vi 6= vj
We write II if IIτi holds for all i ∈ [n].
We note that this condition does not limit the expressiveness of the case tests. If a case
test violates II, it can be split into multiple case tests for each coincidence of instantiated
variables.
Example 6.1. Assume a case test τi with fv(τi) = {x, y, z} that violates IIτi and all free
variables may coincide in any combination. These are given by the partitions of the free
variables. {{x, y, z}}{{x}, {y, z}}{{y}, {x, z}}
{{z}, {x, y}}{{x}, {y}, {z}}
We then need to split τi into five case tests in which the variables in each group are
replaced by a single variable. For example, if y and z coincide, we replace each occurrence
of them by a new variable vy,z. ♦
Injectivity of the instantiations also ensures that the number of instantiated variables
corresponds to the number of free variables.∣∣fv(τi)ρ∣∣ = ∣∣fv(τi)∣∣
Example 6.2. Consider the situation of Example 5.1 and a trace t in which a manager
M1 and the employees E1, E2 cause a violation. Assume there exist single-matched traces
t1, t2 with
Λ(t1) =
{
(τ1,
[
m 7→M2
]
)
}
Λ(t2) =
{
(τ2,
[
ei 7→ E3, ej 7→ E4
]
)
}
,
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where only the necessary parties are corrupted. By RPτ1 , there exists a trace t′1 with
Λ(t′1) =
{
(τ1, [m 7→M1])
}
and
corrupted(t′1) = corrupted(t)[M1 7→M2] = {M2} .
By RPτ2 , there exists a trace t′2 with
Λ(t′2) =
{
(τ2, [ei 7→ E1, ej 7→ E2])
}
and
corrupted(t′2) = corrupted(t)[E1 7→ E3, E2 7→ E4] = {E3, E4} . ♦
We now come back to the counterfactual relation which we have omitted in (14). Our
final goal will be to show the equivalence between the verification conditions of Section 4
and their trace property variant. Therefore, we must be able to introduce as well as
eliminate the relation for which we impose two requirements on the relation.
Relation Introduction (RI) The following has to hold for all i ∈ [n] and all traces t.
Assume t  τiρ for an instantiation ρ. Moreover, assume there exists a single-matched
trace t′ such that
• Λ(t′) =
{
(τi, ρ)
}
,
• corrupted(t′) ⊆ fv(τi)ρ ⊆ corrupted(t), and
•
(
t′  ¬ϕ =⇒ t  ¬ϕ)
hold. Then r(t, t′).
This requirement specifies when two traces t and t′ are considered to be related. First,
t has to match some case test and t′ has to be a single-matched trace with the same case
test and instantiation. Moreover, at most the instantiated parties may be corrupted in
t′. The other requirements are needed to satisfy (1) and (3). Intuitively, if a case test
matches a trace t and there exists a single-matched trace t′ with the same match, which
satisfies all requirements, then t′ is related to t.
Relation Elimination (RE) For all traces t, t′
r(t, t′) =⇒ Λ(t′) ⊆ Λ(t) ∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ corrupted(t) .
This requirement specifies what we know when two traces are related. If two traces
t, t′ are related, then each case test that matches t′ must also match t with the same
instantiation. Moreover, all parties that were corrupted in t′ must also have been
corrupted in t. Intuitively, the violation in the counterfactual trace must be caused in
one of the ways it has been caused in the actual trace.
These requirements may seem strong, but we note that case tests build a more fine-
grained structure that is not expressible in verdicts. They distinguish multiple possible
ways for a set of parties to cause a violation which is invisible in the verdict.
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Example 6.3. Consider two traces t, t′ such that Λ(t′) =
{
(τi, ρi)
}
and Λ(t′) =
{
(τj , ρj)
}
with fv(τi)ρi = fv(τj)ρj . Then verdict(t′) ⊆ verdict(t) but Λ(t′) * Λ(t). In both traces,
the same set of parties causes a violation, but in t′ in the way described by τi and in t in
the way described by τj . ♦
In this way, the trace property variants of the verification conditions, which we will
define next, are stronger than the conditions defined in Section 4. In the soundness proof,
we need RI to introduce the relation which occurs in SFS but not in the trace properties.
In the completeness proof, we need RE to lift the verdict-based verification conditions to
the ones based on case tests. In this way, the relation has to provide the expressiveness
missing in the verdict-based conditions.
In summary, we defined in this section SM, II, RP, RI, and RE. The first two are
expressed as trace properties and can be automatically verified as we will show in Section 7.
The replacement property RP is the only property which has to be shown manually. The
requirements RI and RE serve as lower and upper bounds, respectively, and constrain
the set of compatible counterfactual relations on which the analysis of accountability is
based on.
Using the results we obtained above, we can now finally define the verification conditions
in terms of trace properties. In the following, we assume P to be an accountability
protocol.
Sufficiency (SFtpτi )
SFtpτi ⇐⇒ P ∃
0
SFtpτi
8
where 0
SFtpτi
8
:= ∃~v. τi
[
~v
] ∧ [∀ ~w. τi[~w] =⇒· ~w = ~v]
∧
[ ∧
j∈[n]\{i}
@~x. τj
[
~x
]]
∧ ∀a, k. Corrupted(a)@k =⇒· ∨
`∈idx(~v)
a = ~v`
Verifiability Empty (VEtpϕ )
VEtpϕ ⇐⇒ P ∀
0
VEtpϕ
8
where 0
VEtpϕ
8
:=
[ ∧
i∈[n]
@~v. τi
[
~v
]]
=⇒· ϕ
Verifiability Nonempty (VNEtpϕ,τi)
VNEtpϕ,τi ⇐⇒ P ∀
0
VNEtpϕ,τi
8
27
where 0
VNEtpϕ,τi
8
:= ∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ¬ϕ
Minimality (Mtpτi )
Mtpτi ⇐⇒ P ∀
0
Mtpτi
8
where 0
Mtpτi
8
:= ∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ∧
j∈[n]
@ ~w. τj
[
~w
] ∧ 0~w ( ~v8
Uniqueness (Utpτi )
Utpτi ⇐⇒ P ∀
0
Utpτi
8
where 0
Utpτi
8
:= ∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ∧
`∈idx(~v)
∃k. Corrupted(~v`)@k
We write SFtp, VEtpϕ , VNEtpϕ , Mtp, and Utp if the respective condition holds for all
i ∈ [n]. We denote the conjunction of these conditions by VCtpϕ or simply by VCtp if the
security property can be inferred from context.
6.3 Soundness and Completeness
In the preceding section, we defined building blocks and requirements to finally encode the
verification conditions of Section 4 as trace properties. In this section, we prove that this
encoding achieves soundness and completeness. For this, we show their equivalence to the
verdict-based conditions. Soundness and completeness then follows from Theorems 4.3
and 4.4. In the transformations we perform below, we use (9) to (13), Definition 3.2,
and Corollary 5.3.
Lemma 6.1 (Verifiability).
Vϕ ⇐⇒ VEtpϕ ∧ VNEtpϕ
Proof.
Vϕ
∀t≡ verdict(t) = ∅ ⇐⇒ t  ϕ
∀t≡ (@ i, ρ. t  τiρ) ⇐⇒ t  ϕ
∀t≡
[(∧
i∈[n]
@ρ. t  τiρ
)
=⇒ t  ϕ
]
∧
[(∨
i∈[n]
∃ρ. t  τiρ
)
=⇒ t  ¬ϕ
]
∀t≡
[(∧
i∈[n]
t  @~v. τi
[
~v
])
=⇒ t  ϕ
]
∧
[∧
i∈[n]
∀ρ. (t  τiρ =⇒ t  ¬ϕ)]
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∀t≡
(
t 
[(∧
i∈[n]
@~v. τi
[
~v
])
=⇒· ϕ
])
∧
∧
i∈[n]
(
t 
[
∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ¬ϕ
])
∀t≡ t  0VEtpϕ 8 ∧∧
i∈[n]
t 
0
VNEtpϕ,τi
8
≡ P ∀ 0VEtpϕ 8 ∧∧
i∈[n]
P ∀
0
VNEtpϕ,τi
8
≡ VEtpϕ ∧ VNEtpϕ 
Lemma 6.2 (Minimality).
M ⇐⇒ Mtp
Proof.
M ≡ ∀ t, S. S ∈ verdict(t) =⇒ @S′. S′ ∈ verdict(t) ∧ S′ ( S
≡ ∀ t, i, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒ @j, ρ′. t  τjρ′ ∧ fv(τj)ρ′ ( fv(τi)ρ
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t, ρ. t 
[
τiρ =⇒
∧
j∈[n]
(
@ρ′. t  τjρ′ ∧ fv(τj)ρ′ ( fv(τi)ρ
)]
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t.
[
t  ∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· ∧
j∈[n]
(
@ ~w. τj
[
~w
] ∧ 0~w ( ~v8)]
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t. t  0Mtpτi 8
≡
∧
i∈[n]
P ∀
0
Mtpτi
8
≡ Mtp 
Lemma 6.3 (Uniqueness).
U ⇐⇒ Utp
Proof.
U ≡ ∀ t, S. S ∈ verdict(t) =⇒ S ⊆ corrupted(t)
≡ ∀ t, i, ρ. t  τiρ =⇒ fv(τi)ρ ⊆ corrupted(t)
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t, ρ. t 
[
τiρ =⇒ fv(τi)ρ ⊆ corrupted(t)
]
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t. t 
[
∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· 0~v ⊆ Corrupted8]
≡
∧
i∈[n]
∀ t. t  0Utpτi 8
≡
∧
i∈[n]
P ∀
0
Utpτi
8
≡ Utp 
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Lemma 6.4 (Sufficiency—Soundness).
SFtp ∧ VNEtpϕ ∧ Utp ∧ II ∧ RP =⇒ SF
Proof. Let S ∈ verdict(t). By Corollary 5.3 there exists a case test τi and an instantiation
ρ such that t  τiρ with fv(τi)ρ = S. By SFtpτi there exists a trace t′ such that Λ(t′) ={
(τi, ρ′)
}
and corrupted(t′) ⊆ fv(τi)ρ′. Using (τi, ρ) ∈ Λ(t) as a witness, from IIτi and
RPτi follows the existence of a single-matched trace t′′ with Λ(t′′) =
{
(τi, ρ)
}
and
corrupted(t′′) = corrupted(t′)(ρ ◦ ρ′−1). From the latter follows corrupted(t′′) ⊆ S. It
remains to show that t and t′′ are related. From VNEtpϕ,τi follows t  ¬ϕ and t′′  ¬ϕ. From
Utpτi follows S ⊆ corrupted(t) and thus corrupted(t′′) ⊆ corrupted(t). As all requirements
are fulfilled, we can apply RI to obtain r(t, t′′). Hence,
verdict(t′′) = {S} ∧ corrupted(t′′) ⊆ S ∧ r(t, t′′) ,
and SFS holds. Since S has been arbitrary, the same argument applies to all S, which
shows SF. 
Lemma 6.5 (Sufficiency—Completeness).
SF ∧ SM =⇒ SFtp
Proof. By SM there exists for each case test τi a single-matched trace t such that
Λ(t) =
{
(τi, ρ)
}
. Let S = fv(τi)ρ. From Corollary 5.3 follows S ∈ verdict(t). By SFS
there exists a trace t′ such that
verdict(t′) =
{
S
} ∧ corrupted(t′) ⊆ S ∧ r(t, t′) .
From r(t, t′) follows with RE that Λ(t′) ⊆ Λ(t). From Corollary 5.3 and S ∈ verdict(t)
follows Λ(t′) =
{
(τi, ρ)
}
. Hence, with (12) follows
t′  ∃~v. τi
[
~v
] ∧ [∀ ~w. τi[~w] =⇒· ~w = ~v]
∧
[ ∧
j∈[n]\{i}
@~x. τj
[
~x
]]
∧ 0Corrupted ⊆ ~v8 .
The same argument applies to each single-matched trace for which there exists at least
one for each case test by SM. This shows SFtp. 
Based on the above results, we are able to show the central theorems of this work—
soundness and completeness of VCtp.
Theorem 6.6 (Soundness). For any protocol P, security property ϕ, and case tests
C = τ1, . . . , τn, if VCtp, II, and RP hold, then verdictC provides P with accountability
for ϕ.
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Proof. Assume VCtp, II and RP hold. From Lemmas 6.1 to 6.4 follows VC. By Theorem 4.3
verdict provides P with accountability for ϕ. 
Theorem 6.7 (Completeness). For any protocol P, security property ϕ, and case tests
C = τ1, . . . , τn, if verdictC provides P with accountability for ϕ, and SM holds, then VCtp
holds.
Proof. Assume verdict provides P with accountability for ϕ, and SM holds. From
Theorem 4.4 follows VC. By Lemmas 6.1 to 6.3 and 6.5 follows VCtp. 
6.4 Counterfactual Relations
We conclude this section by discussing the counterfactual relations proposed by Künne-
mann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] and elucidate the implications of the requirements RI, RE
on the relations.
Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] note that there is no consensus in the causality
literature how actual and and counterfactual scenarios should relate. Three approaches
for relating actual and counterfactual traces are proposed.
Control-flow aware rc: Two traces t, t′ are related if and only if they have similar control-
flow. Counterfactual traces have to maintain the same control-flow as the actual
trace to a varying degree. This line of thought has been followed by several works
in the causality literature [10], [15], [21]. One difficulty of this approach is to allow
parties who have been corrupted in t but are honest in t′ to choose a different
control-flow. A practical limitation is that only the control-flow of honest parties
can be observed as the adversary is not modeled as a process with control-flow in
many protocol verification tools. To avoid the aforementioned difficulty, the notion
presented by Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] only captures the control-flow
of trusted parties which cannot be corrupted.
Kind of violation rk: Two traces t, t′ are related if and only if t and t′ describe the same
kind of violations. The authors draw parallels to causality in criminal law in which
distinguishing the kind of a violation may be needed if the standard approach for
determining the cause of certain circumstances—sine qua non—does not give a
satisfactory answer. For example, if a person is poisoned but shot before the poison
took effect, the shooting would not be considered a cause of death, because the
person would have died anyway. A more intuitive approach would distinguish the
types of death. This notion is used in the context of security protocols by Lowe [1].
Weakest relation rw: Two traces t, t′ are related if and only if the set of corrupted
parties in t′ is a subset of the corrupted parties in t. This is the weakest relation
with respect to Definition 3.6. As noted by Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes,
the relation leads to questionable a posteriori verdicts when collusion of multiple
parties is possible but not necessary to cause a violation. For example, if parties A
and B collude in the actual trace but a different attack is mounted only by B in
the counterfactual trace. We also note that the relation permits blaming dishonest
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but not deviating parties for a violation, even if the verdict contains only singleton
sets. Assume parties A and B are corrupted and a violation is caused by A alone
in the actual trace. Then the counterfactual trace in which only B provokes the
violation is related to the actual trace; thus blaming B even though it has not
deviated in the actual trace.
Considering the control-flow aware relation rc, we emphasize that our approach allows
encoding requirements on the control-flow into the case tests. However, due to the
requirement RE, which allows us to eliminate the relation, only sharing a similar control-
flow is not sufficient for two traces to be related in our approach.
We also note that the same requirement renders it incompatible with rw. As we have
explained in Section 6.2, the case tests build a more fine-grained structure that is not
expressible in verdicts. It is therefore natural that the weakest relation with respect to
Definition 3.6 is not sufficient for our needs.
A promising interpretation of the case tests, understands the case tests as possibilities
to violate the security of a protocol. This corresponds to the relation rk considering
the kind of the violation. Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes [22] describe this relation
only superficially as it would be informal and depend on intuition. We have to object
the former statement as a formal approach that distinguishes between different kinds of
violations has been demonstrated in this work. Whether intuition is required to define
case tests and how much is already implied by the protocol and the security property
itself may vary from case to case.
7 Verifying Accountability using Tamarin
Tamarin [13] is a protocol verification tool that supports falsification and unbounded
verification in the symbolic model. Security protocols are specified using multiset rewrite
rules, but support for specifying protocols in SAPiC [14] has recently been added. This
makes Tamarin particularly suitable for integrating our results and adding the ability to
verify accountability properties in a highly automated way. In this section, we describe
different aspects of our implementation—namely, accountability lemmas, syntactical
additions, and a sufficient condition to ensure guardedness of the generated lemmas.
7.1 Accountability Lemmas
In the previous section, we defined the trace properties SFtpτi , VE
tp
ϕ , VNEtpϕ,τi , Mtpτi , Utpτi ,
IIτi , SMτi . By extending Tamarin with the ability to define accountability lemmas and
case tests, these can be automatically generated as standard lemmas which Tamarin
natively supports. Each accountability lemma consists of a set of case tests and a security
property and thus specifies a verdict function according to Definition 5.2.
Definition 7.1 (Accountability lemma). Let C be a set of case tests and ϕ a security
property. Then (C, ϕ) is called an accountability lemma.
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Suffix Condition
suff SFtpτi
verif_empty VEtpϕ
verif_nonempty VNEtpϕ,τi
min Mtpτi
uniq Utpτi
inj IIτi
single SMτi
Table 2: Suffixes of generated lemmas
An accountability lemma holds for a protocol P if Tamarin can successfully verify all
generated lemmas and the replacement property RP holds.
We can restate Theorems 6.6 and 6.7 in terms of accountability lemmas.
Theorem 7.2 (Soundness). If the accountability lemma (C, ϕ) holds for a protocol P,
then verdictC provides P with accountability for ϕ.
Proof. By Theorem 6.6. 
Theorem 7.3 (Completeness). If verdictC provides a protocol P with accountability for
ϕ, then the accountability lemma (C, ϕ) holds for P.
Proof. By Theorem 6.7. 
Remark 7.4. The replacement property RP is a hyperproperty, which has to be verified
manually, for example, by arguing about the syntactic structure of the protocol.
7.2 Extending Tamarin
In order to define accountability lemmas and case tests in Tamarin, we have extended
its language by two syntactical additions. Case tests are specified by
test 〈name〉:
"〈τ〉"
where name is the name of the case test to be defined and τ is its formula. Accountability
lemmas are defined similar to standard lemmas
lemma 〈name〉:
〈name1〉,...,〈namen〉 account(s) for "〈τ〉"
where name is the name of the lemma, namei are the names of previously defined case tests,
and τ is the security property. The names of the lemmas generated for an accountability
lemma have the following structure
〈lemma-name〉_〈case-test-name〉_〈suffix〉
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where suffix is named according to Table 2 and case-test-name is not used for VEtpϕ .
The implementation allows defining an arbitrary number of accountability lemmas
which is especially useful when experimenting with different sets of case test, discovering
potential attacks, and analyzing accountability properties in general.
7.3 Ensuring Guardedness
Trace properties in Tamarin are specified by trace formulas from a guarded fragment
of two-sorted first-order logic. Guardedness imposes requirements on the structure
of the trace formulas. Universally and existentially quantified variables have to be
guarded by an action constraint directly after the quantifier in which all the variables
occur. For universally quantified trace formulas, the outermost logical operator inside
the quantifier has to be an implication; for existentially quantified trace formulas a
conjunction. Formally, we can define guardedness as follows.
Definition 7.5 (Guarded trace formula). A trace formula ϕ is guarded if there exists a
fact Action ∈ F and a trace formulas ψ such that
ϕ = ∃~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ ψ(~x) , (15)
or
ϕ = ∀~x, i. Action(~x)@i =⇒· ψ(~x) . (16)
In order for Tamarin to verify the generated lemmas, we have to ensure that they
conform to either (15) or (16). Taking a closer look on the defined trace properties in
Section 6, we see that a case test τi occurs in exactly three different kinds of subformulas.
∃~v. τi
[
~v
]
(17)
∀~v. ¬τi
[
~v
]
(18)
∀~v. τi
[
~v
]
=⇒· γ(~v) (19)
Assume τi is guarded and has the form of (15). Expanding τi in the above formulas
yields
∃~v. ∃~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ (ψ(~x))[~v]
≡ ∃~v, ~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ (ψ(~x))[~v]
∀~v. ¬(∃~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ (ψ(~x))[~v])
≡ ∀~v, ~x, i. Action(~x)@i =⇒· ¬(ψ(~x))[~v]
∀~v. (∃~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ (ψ(~x))[~v]) =⇒· γ(~v)
≡ ∀~v, ~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ (ψ(~x))[~v] =⇒· γ(~v) .
All formulas are in the form of (15) or (16) and are thus themselves guarded.
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Assume τi is guarded and has the form of (16). Expanding τi in the above formulas
yields
∃~v. ∀~x, i. Action(~x)@i =⇒· (ψ(~x))[~v]
∀~v. ¬(∀~x, i. Action(~x)@i =⇒· (ψ(~x))[~v])
≡ ∀~v. ∃~x, i. Action(~x)@i ∧ ¬(ψ(~x))[~v]
∀~v. (∀~x, i. Action(~x)@i =⇒· (ψ(~x))[~v]) =⇒· γ(~v)
≡ ∀~v. ∃~x, i. (¬Action(~x)@i ∨ (ψ(~x))[~v]) =⇒· γ(~v) .
We notice that none of the formulas has the form of (15) or (16), since universal and
existential quantifiers cannot be combined. Trace formulas of this form are outside the
guarded fragment that Tamarin can verify. However, a case test τi in the form of (16)
can be transform into a case test τ ′i in the form of (15) by adding guardedness constraints.
We have
τ ′i
[
~v
]
=
[
∃k.
∧
`∈idx(~v)
Guarded(~v`)@k
]
∧ τi
[
~v
]
,
which is guarded and in the form of (15). If the protocol is adapted to issue Guarded
events for all parties in A, then τ ′i is equivalent to τi.
In summary, to ensure the guardedness of the generated lemmas, it is sufficient to
require that all case tests are guarded and in the form of (15). Since a guarded case test
can always be transformed into this form, this is only a technical requirement and does
not limit the expressiveness of the case tests. Moreover, we note that this is a sufficient
but not necessary condition. There are case tests that are not guarded themselves but
the generated lemmas are.
7.4 Implications of the Results
When modeling and analyzing accountability properties of protocols with Tamarin, two
outcomes are possible. Either Tamarin is able to verify all conditions or at least one
condition is violated. In the latter case, it can be very helpful to know the implications
of the failure such that we gain a better understanding of the problem. In this section,
we discuss possible failures, highlight their implications, and give hints on how to fix the
problems.
The implications of a failed condition are depicted in Figure 3. Each arrow in the
diagram represents an implication, each branch a disjunction. The implications follow
from Lemmas 6.1 to 6.3 and 6.5, and Definition 3.8 as well as the definitions of the
respective conditions. For example, if ¬VNEtpϕ , we know by Lemma 6.1 that ¬Vϕ. Hence,
¬VC and by Theorem 4.4 accountability is not provided.
In the following, we discuss the meaning of each failed condition and give hints on how
to fix the problems.
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¬VCtp ¬SM ¬II
¬Utp ¬Mtp ¬VEtpϕ ¬VNEtpϕ ¬SFtp ¬RP
¬U ¬M ¬Vϕ ¬SF ¬SM
¬VC
¬Acc ¬Acc / Acc
Figure 3: Decision diagram for the requirements and verification conditions defined in
Section 6. Each edge represents an implication, each branch a disjunction.
¬SFtpτi There does not exist a single-matched trace for τi in which only a subset of
the blamed parties is corrupted. At least one party which is needed to a cause
a violation is not blamed. Accountability may still be provided.
Hint: Assume VNEtpϕ,τi . If ¬SMτi , we should solve this problem first. In all
single-matched traces of τi, there exists at least one corrupted party which is
not one of the instantiated free variables of τi. It may be possible to revise τi
by adding additional free variables and action constraints such that all parties
needed for a violation are blamed by τi.
¬VEtpϕ,τi No case test holds but the security property is violated. This indicates that
the case tests are not exhaustive, that is, capture all possible ways to cause a
violation. Accountability is not provided.
Hint: The trace Tamarin found as a counterexample may give a hint for an
additional case test or shows that the security can be violated in an unintended
way.
¬VNEtpϕ,τi The case test τi holds but the security property is not violated. This indi-
cates that there exists a trace where τi is not sufficient to cause a violation.
Accountability is not provided.
Hint: The trace Tamarin found as a counterexample may give a hint to revise
τi such that for all traces in which it holds the security property is violated.
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¬Mtpτi There exists an instantiation of a case test τj which blames strictly less parties
than an instantiation of τi in the same trace. Accountability is not provided.
Hint: Assume VNEtpτi and VNE
tp
τj . If both τi and τj are necessary for VE
tp
ϕ to
hold, they need to be separated such that they do not hold simultaneously.
This can be accomplished by replacing τi with τi ∧ ¬
(
τj ∧
0
fv(τj) ( fv(τi)
8)
.
¬Utpτi A party is blamed by an instantiation of τi but it has not been corrupted,
thereby holding an honest party accountable. Accountability is not provided.
Hint: Assume VNEtpϕ,τi . If ¬Mtpτi , we should solve this problem first. The trace
Tamarin found as a counterexample shows which party is blamed without
having been corrupted. If the corresponding instantiated free variable can
never be corrupted, it can be quantified in τi to avoid being blamed. If it can
be corrupted for some traces, a closer look on τi and the protocol is necessary.
¬SMtpτi There does not exist a single-matched trace for τi. Either
(i) there does not exist a trace where τi holds, or
(ii) τi always holds with multiple instantiations, or
(iii) for all traces there exist another case test which holds at the same time
Accountability may still be provided.
Hint: Assume VNEtpϕ,τi . In case (i), τi may be ill-defined or contains a logic
error. In case (ii), if all the instantiations are permutations of each other, a
single-matched trace may be obtained by making τi antisymmetric. Then for
all instantiations ρ, ρ’
t  τiρ ∧ t  τiρ′ ∧ fv(τi)ρ = fv(cti)ρ′ =⇒ ρ = ρ′ .
If the instantiations are not permutations, at least two disjoint groups of
parties are always blamed. This requires a closer look an τi and the protocol.
In case (iii), it may be possible to merge multiple case tests together for which
then a single-matched trace exists.
¬IItpτi The case test τi is not injective. There exists an instantiation mapping distinct
free variables to the same party. Accountability may still be provided.
Hint: See Example 6.1 for a way to split τi.
We note that for the conditions SFtpτi , Mtpτi , Utpτi , and SMτi , we assumed above that the
case tests satisfy VNEtpϕ,τi . If this is not the case, then the case test has a fatal error—it
does not always lead to a violation—which renders the other conditions meaningless.
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8 Conclusion
In this work, we combined the accountability definition of Künnemann, Esiyok, and Backes
[22] with the notion of case tests—an idea inspired by the accountability tests of Bruni,
Giustolisi, and Schuermann [19]. By following the top-down approach of Künnemann,
Esiyok, and Backes and considering accountability as a problem of causation, we obtained
a sound foundation from which we derived a set of verdict-based verification conditions.
We introduced the notion of case tests and used them to define verdict functions
achieving a high degree of flexibility. This allows us to analyze the accountability
properties of protocols with unbounded sets of parties, thereby significantly increasing
the applicability of the original definition. Our approach also improves readability, as we
may consider each case test as a specific manifestation of a violation, in contrast to the
previous, explicit formulation of the verdict function. We showed how the verdict-based
verification conditions can be expressed using case tests and finally be encoded in terms
of trace properties.
We identified conditions on the relation between actual and counterfactual traces
that allow to encode notions of causality based on control-flow [10], [15], [21] or kind of
violation [1] in the case tests. The inherent restriction that, for each protocol, there is a
decomposition of each trace that separates interleaving causally relevant events so they
can be regarded in isolation seems, at least in principle, compatible with the notions of
causality that we are aware of.
We extended Tamarin with the ability to define accountability lemmas and case tests
which can now automatically generate our derived verification conditions. Even though
a single condition, the replacement property, has to be checked manually to achieve
soundness, the effort required to analyze accountability properties of protocols with
unbounded sets of parties has been significantly reduced.
Limitations Even though our approach achieves a high degree of automation, the
replacement property RP we need for soundness is a hyperproperty and needs to be
verified manually. Moreover, we suspect that for complicated case tests the lemmas
automatically generated by our implementation can become quite complex and thus
increase computation time.
Future Work It is an interesting open question we may address in future work, how
we can avoid the need to manually check the replacement property and thus get a fully
automatic verification of accountability supporting protocols with unbounded sets of
parties. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach and the practicability of our
implementation, we will analyze the accountability properties of real-world protocols in
the future.
The stronger requirements on the counterfactual relation depend on the definition of
Λ. It may be promising to extend this definition to include more information of a trace,
such as control events, to increase the space of compatible relations.
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